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Abstract 
This study focus on the subject of corporate ownership, which have a significant impact on important 
corporate decisions. This study examined the effect of different type of ownership structure such as 
institutional ownership, managerial ownership, individual ownership, blockholder ownership and foreign 
ownership on stock returns volatility of listed firms in KSE. In this study stock return volatility is 
considered as dependent variable while the ownership structure variables and control variables were 
considered as independent variables. The empirical analysis of this research on the randomly selected 
sample of eighty firms for the period of six years starting from 2005 to 2011 from Karachi Stock 
Exchange 100-index.  Regression analysis has been used in order to investigate the relationship of each 
type of ownership structure with the stock return volatility. The empirical results of the study suggested a 
negative relationship between managerial share ownership and stock returns volatility. The results 
further suggest that those firms whose greater percentage of stocks are held by their block holders may 
have less stock returns volatility. Furthermore results suggested that foreign ownership has also negative 
relationship with stock returns volatility. 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Stock Returns Volatility, Managerial Share Ownership, Foreign 
Share Ownership, and Block Holder Share Ownership. 
Introduction  
 
1.1 Introduction and Background 
The origin of ownership structures of corporations are linked to the Adam Smith, The 
Wealth of Nations (1776). Ownership structure can be defined as distribution of shares 
with voting power and capital. The corporate ownership structures are of great 
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importance in corporate governance system of different countries because these structures 
actually determine the different incentives and allowances managers and effectiveness 
and efficiency of the modern corporations they manage. 
 The concept of ownership structures of corporations in the world is around two 
approaches that is perspective of shareholders and perspective of stakeholders. The 
stakeholder perspective scope is broader than shareholder perspective in the sense that 
stakeholder perspective proponents argued that corporations must operate in the interest 
of shareholders in addition to key stakeholder’s interest of the firm, while shareholder 
perspective keep care of the interest of the shareholders only. This difference of in both 
perspectives leads to different results which are not only confined to the basic objective 
of the firm but also to differences in system of corporate governance system within the 
organization, ownership structure, corporate bodies etc. the ownership structure scenario 
arises with the incorporation of modern corporation in which ownership and control of 
firms lies in different hands. 
This thing is first noticed by Berle and Mean (1932). Ownership structure is based on 
fractionated ownership. The first theory that is classical corporate finance theory which 
was presented by Modigliani and Miller (1958) in which they simply divide capital into 
debt and equity. Furthermore they did not provide the decomposition of ownership 
structure.  After Modigliani and Miller, Jensen and Meckling (1970) came with 
ownership structure theory, in which they argued that ownership structure can be defined 
by three things that are internal equity, external equity and debts. They also did not come 
with the decomposition of ownership structure but made slight modification to classical 
corporate finance theory by dividing equity into two parts. The ownership structure 
changes came into existence with the globalization of stock markets also known as broker 
markets, feasible trading of stock, foreign investments and other factors which mainly 
includes merger and acquisition (M&A). Foreign investments mainly come from merger 
and acquisition which results in changes in corporate ownership structure and hence in 
corporate governance system. 
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1.2  Research Questions: 
i. What is the impact of managerial ownership (MANGR) structure on returns volatility 
(RV)? 
ii. What is the impact of institutional ownership (INS) structure on returns volatility (RV)? 
iii. What is the impact of individual ownership structure (INDVD) on returns volatility 
(RV)? 
iv. What is the impact of foreign ownership structure (FO) on returns volatility (RV)? 
v. What is the impact of block holder ownership structure (BH) on returns volatility (RV)? 
1.3  Research Objectives: 
i. To investigate the impact of managerial ownership structure on returns volatility (RV). 
ii.  To investigate the impact of institutional ownership structure on returns volatility (RV). 
iii. To investigate the impact of individual ownership structure on returns volatility (RV). 
iv. To investigate the impact of foreign ownership structure on returns volatility (RV). 
v. To investigate the impact of block holder ownership structure on returns volatility (RV). 
 
Review of Literature and Theoretical Frame work 
. 
Maher and Andersson (1999) know that corporate governance system is different across 
countries. It can be distinguished by ownership structure and controlling of shareholders. The 
two systems i.e. insider and outsider adopted by different countries. Under both systems conflicts 
arises between manager and shareholders, majority and minority shareholders, which affect the 
performance of the company which materialize in the shape of stock price volatility. Hotchkiss 
and Strickland (August, 2003) investigated that when firm actual earnings are below than 
expected; it shows a negative impact on stock price. Hotchkiss and Strickland (August, 2003) 
argued that ownership structure is related to stock price volatility especially in earnings 
announcement days. Empirical results further explain that institutional ownership has a strong 
and significant effect on stock prices, when the corporation information releases. Lemmon and 
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Lins (2003) investigated the effect of ownership structure on firm’s performance. The financial 
crisis in East Asian countries which began in 1997 showed negative impact on firm’s investment 
opportunities, while higher incentives for controlling shareholders which may exploit minority 
shareholders. The results showed that stock returns of firms with high level of control perform 
10% to 20% lower than firms with low of control. Hence it is proved that ownership structure 
has an important impact on firm’s performance and Stock Returns. Chen et al. (2003) studied the 
relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance. They argued that in Japan 
managers have very little stake in firms as compared to US. Results showed that negative 
significant relationship exit between firm’s performance and low managerial ownership and vice 
versa. Therefore it is empirically investigated that with the increase in ownership, the conflicts 
between management and shareholders reduces. Rubin (2006) examined here that whether any 
link exist between liquidity of company’s shares and its ownership structure. First of all it is 
investigated that how much shares of the company are owned by insiders and institutions and to 
what extent there is concentrated. The findings showed that relation between these two variables 
is mostly driven by institutional ownership rather than institutional holdings. Hence it was 
proved that liquidity is positively related to institutional ownership and vice versa. Rubin and 
Smith (2007) developed a research paper to find the relationship between ownership and share 
return volatility. They study, indeed, the effect of dividend policy on these two variables i.e. 
ownership and share return volatility and their relationship. It was found that correlation exist 
between these two depends on company’s dividend policy. The results showed that institutional 
ownership is positively related to volatility and dividend paying shares and vice versa. Finally it 
is investigated that dividend policy has significant effect on Stock Returns. Aydin et al. (2007) 
conducted study in order to find that whether foreign owned firms are far better than national 
firms, quoted on Istanbul Stock Exchange, Turkey. They argued that foreign owned firms are far 
better than domestic firms in Turkey in respect of Return on Assets (ROAs). They also found 
that foreign ownership have positively related to firm performance, which means that foreign 
participation positively effects profitability performance of the firms at ISE. Desender et al. 
(2008) empirically studied that whether Stock Returns are affected by ownership structure or not. 
The findings of research showed that both type of ownership whether it is insider or concentrated 
affect stock price performance. Stock prices are positively correlated to insider ownership and 
negatively to concentrated ownership. 
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Corporate governance came into existence in order to reduce conflicts, based on agency theory, 
between controllers of and residual claimants of the firm. Corporate governance is a mechanism 
which is used to align controller’s goals with those of stakeholders, which is to maximize 
shareholder’s wealth. Chaghadari (2011) argued that independency, board size and ownership 
structure have no significant effect on firm’s performance. However, negative relationship of 
firm’s performance with CEO duality. Nazir et al. (2010) investigated the corporate dividend 
policy issue in corporate finance. Nazir et al. (2010) developed this research paper in order to 
examine dividend policy role in determining stock price volatility. Empirical results showed that 
a strong and significant relationship exist between dividend policy and stock price volatility. 
These findings are consistent with the earlier research of Rashid and Rahman (2008) citation 
down. Ongore (March, 2011) studied the effect of ownership structure on firm’s performance of 
the listed companies in Kenya. Ongore (March, 2011) investigated that highly significant 
negative relationship existence of concentrated ownership and government ownership with 
firm’s performance, while positive and significant relationship exist with foreign ownership, 
diffuse ownership, corporation ownership and managerial ownership. Ongore et al. (2011) also 
argued that a significant positive relationship exist between managerial ownership (insider) and 
firm’s performance. 
2. Theoretical Frame work 
Figure: 1 
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Figure 1 shows the impact of ownership structure on Stock Returns volatility in diagram form. It 
gives a very clear picture of the nature of the variables. On left side, Stock Returns volatility, is 
the dependent variable in the research study while on the right side, ownership structure, is the 
independent variable in the research study. As we know that the ownership structure is the 
compound variable that’s why we categorize it into the above different form of ownership 
structure. 
 
3.Research Designed and Methodology 
 
3.1  Population: 
This refers to the companies from which we are going to take data for analysis purpose. The 
population consists of different companies taken from different sectors which are listed at KSE-
100 index of Islamic Republic of Pakistan. 
3.2 Sample Size: 
Sample consists of more than 75 companies which are selected from different sectors mainly 
includes textile, oil & gas, cement, telecommunication, food producers etc. The sample primarily 
includes firms of non-financial nature because financial structure of financial firms is relatively 
different from non-financial firms. Then in each sector those firms have been selected in the 
sample for which data is available for the same duration. It means availability and same duration 
data, are the main factors, in selecting firms from different sectors. The data collected for those 
firms from 2005 to 2011. 
3.3  Data Collection Sources:  
Data has been collected for this research from individual firm website and KSE analysis reports 
which are available on website of KSE. 
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3.4 Statistical Tools & Techniques: 
In this research study different statistical tools and techniques have been used some major of 
them are mean, standard deviation, kurtosis, regression and correlation. 
i. Regression Analysis 
ii. Correlation Analysis  
iii. Descriptive Statistics   
 
3.5 Model : Stock Returns Volatility, Institutional ownership, Managerial  
Ownership, Individual Ownership, Foreign Ownership and Block 
Holder Ownership 
 RVe  =  λ0 λ1INSiλ2MANGRI λ3 INDVDiλ4FO i   
 
λ5BHi λ6FSi λ7FGiλ8FPRλ9TANG+ 
λ10 NONDEBTi 
The purpose of above multiple and step wise regression analysis is to check the significance of 
each variable thoroughly. 
3.6   Controlling Variables: 
In this research study we took two control variables i.e. firm size (FS), firm growth (FG), 
tangibility of assets (TANG) and firm profitability (FPR). 
For the estimation of the size of the firm we use different indexes such as firm’s total assets, 
number of employees and market value of the firm. For estimation of firm size in this research 
we use the last index. In the same way different methods are used for estimation of trading 
volume of firm such as trading numbers, share traded numbers and trade value. We use the last 
one i.e. trade value for the estimation of volume of trade. (Sabri 2008). 
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3.7  Definitions of Variables: 
Variables of research study defined as follows in the context of literature review: 
i. Institutional Ownership: 
The amount of institutional ownership is equal to the shares held by large block holders in the 
company. Large block holders in the companies are institutional investors. Institutional investors 
actually own at least 5% of ownership in the company’s total equity. It is denoted by the symbol 
“INS”. 
H1: There is a significant relationship between institutional ownership and Stock Returns 
volatility  
ii. Managerial Share Ownership: 
In this research study managerial ownership mean the amount of ownership held by the board of 
directors, executives, management and their families in the total share capital of the firm. It is 
denoted by the symbol “MANGR”. 
H2: There is a significant relationship between managerial ownership and Stock Returns 
volatility  
iii. Individual Ownership: 
As the name suggests that portion of ownership held by individuals in a firm for which 
“INDVD” symbol is used. 
H3: There is a significant relationship between individual ownership and Stock Returns volatility  
iv. Foreign Ownership: 
The portion of ownership held by foreign investors in the total share capital of the firm. It is 
denoted by “FO” in this research study. 
H4: There is a significant relationship between foreign ownership and Stock Returns volatility  
v. Block Holder Ownership: 
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The portion of ownership held by block holders in the total share capital of the firm. Block  
holders Ownership is equal to the sum of the percentage of ownership held by block holders in a 
company for which “BH” symbol is used. 
H5: There is a significant relationship between block holder ownership and Stock Returns 
volatility  
vi. Firm Size: 
In our concerned research study firm size refers to the market value of the firm, denoted by 
“FS”. 
 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
 
The analysis section of the research study consists of the descriptive statistics of the variables 
considered in the study, the Pearson correlation analysis of different form ownership structure 
and control variables which were considered in the analysis along with the independent variable 
which is ownership structure categorized into five form that are managerial, foreign, 
institutional, individual and block holder form of ownership and the last section includes the 
multiple regression analysis of all the variables considered in this research study. 
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4.1 Table Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Ownership Structure Variables   
VARIABLES OBS MEAN STD. DEV. MINI MAX 
MANGR 480 0.1621458 0.2156229 0 0.92 
INDVD 479 .2546286 0.183275 0 0.896 
FO 480 .0551521 0.1488226 0 0.96 
INS 479 .2319332 0.1998437 0 0.967 
BH 480 .5924792 0.2475101 0 0.996 
Panel A of Table 5.1 shows the descriptive statistics of different forms of ownership structure. 
shows the ownership variables where MANGR stands for managerial ownership, INDVD for 
individual ownership, INS for institutional ownership. FO for foreign ownership and BH for 
block holder ownership. The third column of the panel A shows the means, fourth column shows 
standard deviation, fifth column shows minimum value of each type of ownership structure while 
sixth column shows the maximum values of each type of ownership structure. 
 
Panel B Financial Variables  
Return 479 -0.96789 0.5213053 -2.158 1.594 
FS 480 3.63321 1.09165 1.0828 9.7761 
FPR 480 .1349346 0.2072085 -.2775 2.1279 
FG 479 .2020173 0.8067032 -.9962 14.145 
NONDEBT 480 .0342863 0.0205668 0 0.1016 
TANG 480 .4635815 0.2365946 0 0.9265 
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Panel B of the table 5.1 shows the descriptive statistics of financial variables used in the study 
such as Return firm size, firm profitability, firm growth, non debt and tangibility of assets. In 
table variables are showed by symbols given by the researcher for this study. Where FS stands 
for firm size, FPR for firm profitability, FG for firm growth, TANG for tangibility and 
NONDEBT stands for non debt standard. The descriptive statistics includes mean, standard 
deviation, minimum value and maximum value of each control variable. 
Table 4.2       Pearson   Correlation 
 RV MANGR INDVD INS BH FS FPR FG TANG 
RV 1.000         
MANGR -0.0174 1.000        
INDVD 0.0192 0.2392 1.000       
INS 0.0741 -0.2762 -0.1718 1.000      
BH -0.1652 -0.0561 -0.4100 -0.0536 1.000     
FS -0.1550 -0.1003 -0.0850 0.1182 0.0420 1.000    
FPR 0.1183 0.0353 -0.0873 -0.0327 -0.0085 0.1168 1.000   
FG -0.0700 -0.0155 -0.0322 0.0924 0.0330 0.2017 -0.0268 1.000  
TANG 0.0875 -0.1438 0.0479 0.1201 -0.0490 -0.0995 -0.1706 -0.0310 1.000 
Table 4.2 shows the correlation between the variables used in the research study. Where 
MANGR stands for managerial ownership, INDVD for individual ownership, INS for 
institutional ownership. FO for foreign ownership and BH for block holder ownership. Financial 
variables such as Return, FS stands for firm size, FPR for firm profitability, FG for firm growth, 
TANG for tangibility and NONDEBT stands for non debt standard. The negative signs values 
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show the negative correlation while positive values show positive correlation. Correlation values 
lies between -1 and +1. These two values are the extremes of correlation magnitude. While 
correlation value “0” no correlation between the variables under consideration. The correlation 
value lies between 0 and +/-0.40 shows low correlation between variables, while between +/-
0.39 and +/- 0.60 shows medium correlation, while between +/-0.60 and +/-1 shows high 
correlation between variables under consideration. 
4.3 Pearson Correlation 
The correlation table shows the degree of linear association between the different variables 
consider under the analysis. It shows the strength as well as direction of the association between 
the variables. The correlation coefficient value (r) between the returns volatility (RV) and 
MANGR is -0.0174 which represent negative association between the returns volatility and 
managerial ownership. This implies that if the managerial ownership is increasing the return 
volatility decreases by 0.0174. 
The correlation values between the returns volatility (RV) and INDVD is 0.0192, which shows 
positive correlation between variables which are returns volatility (RV) and individual share 
ownership structure. The value implies that any variation in individual share ownership will 
associated with returns volatility by 0.0192. But the variation will be in the same direction; 
however value implies low positive correlation between variables. 
The correlation values between the returns volatility (RV) and institutional share ownership 
structure is 0.0741 which also shows positive correlation between institutional ownership and 
returns volatility. The higher the institutional ownership the higher will be the returns volatility, 
however correlation is very between variables. The correlation coefficient between block holder 
ownership and returns volatility is -0.1652 which represents negative relationship between 
variables, means with the increase in BH ownership the returns volatility will be decreases by 
0.1652. However correlation is very weak between considered variables. The correlation values 
between the returns volatility (RV) and firm size is -0.1550 which implies negative correlation 
between returns volatility and firm size. By expanding firm size, return volatility will be 
decreases by 0.1550. The correlation coefficient between returns volatility (RV) and firm 
profitability is 0.1183 which implies positive correlation between firm profitability and returns 
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volatility. The higher the firm profitability the higher will be returns volatility. By increasing 
firm profitability the return volatility will also increases by 0.1183. The correlation coefficient 
between returns volatility (RV) and firm growth is -0.0700 which shows negative correlation 
between returns volatility and firm growth. By increasing the firm growth the returns volatility 
will be decreases by 0.0700. So it means that by increasing firm growth the returns volatility can 
be decreases. The correlation value between returns volatility and tangibility is 0.0875 which 
implies positive correlation between returns volatility and tangibility of the firm. The higher the 
tangibility of the firm the higher will be the volatility of the firm’s returns. By looking 
thoroughly at the correlation table we noticed that correlation coefficient of all variables under 
consideration lies between 0 and +/- 0.40 which means that correlation exist up to some extent 
among variables but the magnitude is very week. 
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Table 4.3 REGRESSION MODEL 
Dependent variable (SPV) 
Variables Coefficients Std Error t-values P-values 
MANGR 
INDVD 
INS 
BH 
FO 
FS 
FPR 
FG 
TANG 
Constant 
-0.96506 
-0.0597943 
0.102338 
-0.1857152 
-0.093561 
-0.0413237 
0.1966305 
-0.0114138 
0.0924495 
0.7495533 
0.0608218 
0.0767538 
0. 00653174 
0.055255 
0.0563421 
0.0116533 
0.0603885 
0.0154954 
0.053484 
0.0724382 
-16.23 
-0.78 
15.7 
-3.36 
-5.65 
-3.55 
3.26 
-0.74 
1.73 
10.35 
0.000 
0.436 
0.000 
0.001 
0.0065 
0.000 
0.001 
0.462 
0.085 
0.000 
F-value     27.39 
P-value     0.000 
R-Squared                          0.12 
Adjusted R-squared           0.11 
Durbin Watson 2.6 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.3 shows the outputs of ordinary least square regression analysis. The first column in the 
table shows the symbol representing different variables which are under consideration in the 
research such as MANGR stands for managerial ownership, INDVD for individual ownership, 
INS for institutional ownership. FO for foreign ownership and BH for block holder ownership. 
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Financial variables such as Return, FS stands for firm size, FPR for firm profitability, FG for 
firm growth, TANG for tangibility and NONDEBT stands for non debt standard. The second 
column in the table shows the coefficients of variables and their impact on the dependent 
variable. The negative sign shows the negative impact on dependent variable and vice versa. The 
fourth and fifth columns of table shows the significance of the relationship which was showed by 
the coefficients of the variables. In case contradiction exists in the results of t-value and p-value. 
The decision should be made on the p-value. In the lower part of the table F-value shows the 
significance of the model overall, R square value shows the explanatory power of the variables, 
Adjusted R square value also shows the explanatory power of the variables but after extraction 
of the abnormal values from the data and Durbin Watson value shows the time trend in the data. 
 
4.4 Interpretation of the Results  
 
The above table 4.3 shows the results of the regression Ordinary Least Square Method (OLS). 
Regression analysis is done to test for the measurement of the dependency of the dependent 
variable that is returns volatility on different independent variables such as ownership structure 
of different types and some financial variables like firm size, firm growth, and firm profitability 
and tangibility of assets. The coefficient of the returns volatility and the managerial share 
ownership is -0.965. This shows that there has negative impact of the firm managerial ownership 
on the stock return volatility. The relationship is significant as the t-calculated value (-16.23) is 
greater than the t-critical value (-2.0) at 5% confidence interval. Similarly the p-value calculated 
(0.000) is less the critical value at 5%. So the relationship is significant, keeping all other factor 
constant if managerial ownership is change by 1%the stock returns volatility shall be change by 
0.96%. Thus if the firm wants to control the returns volatility then managerial ownership should 
be increased. It also suggested that those firms with higher managerial share ownership will have 
lower returns volatility. The coefficient of the individual share ownership structure and returns 
volatility is 0.05. This represents the negative relationship between firm’s returns volatility and 
individual share ownership structure. The relationship is insignificant as t-value of the coefficient 
is less than t-critical value|2| at 5% confidence interval. Similarly p-value is 0.436which is 
greater than 5%. So the relationship is significant. The coefficient of institutional ownership is 
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0.10.This values implies the positive relationship exist between stock return volatility and 
institutional ownership. For the relationship significance we look at t-value and p-value. By 
looking at t-value of institutional ownership coefficient which is 15.7 greater then t-statistics 
critical values which mean that relationship is significant. While p-value which is 0.000 greater 
then critical p-value5% so p-value shows that relationship is insignificant.  In order to decide 
whether the relationship is significant or insignificant we usually give preference to the p-value. 
So it is concluded that the relationship between institutional ownership and stock return volatility 
is insignificant. The blockholder ownership coefficient is -0.18 which implies negative 
relationship between stock return volatility and block holder ownership. The relationship is 
significant as t-value is 3.36 which is greater than t-critical values at 5% confidence of interval. 
Similarly the p value which 0.001 less then p critical value so the relationship is significant. 
Keeping all things constant if block holder ownership is increases by 1% stock return volatility 
can be decreased by 0.18%. Thus if the firm wants to control the stock return volatility then the 
block holder ownership should be increased. It also argued that the firm with higher block holder 
ownership will have minimum return volatility. The coefficient of foreign ownership is -0.09 
which shows negative relationship with stock return volatility. The relationship is significant 
because both t and p value are significant at 5% confidence interval. As we came to know that 
the relationship is significant by t and p value interpretation, keeping other things constant if we 
increase foreign ownership by 1% stock return will be decreased by 0.09%. Thus it is suggested 
that if firm control stock returns volatility, foreign ownership should be increased. The 
coefficient of firm size is -0.04. This value shows that there is negative relationship exist 
between stock returns volatility and firm size. The relationship is significant as interpreted by t-
value and p-value of coefficient at 5% confidence interval. Keeping other things constant if we 
expand firm size by 1% stock returns volatility will be decreased by 0.04%. It is also suggested 
that stock returns volatility can be decreased by increasing firm size. Thus if the firm want to 
control stock returns volatility it should increase firm size. FPR coefficient value is 0.19 which 
shows that positive relationship exist between stock returns volatility and firm profitability. The 
relationship is significant as interpreted by both t-value and  P-value of the coefficient of the firm 
profitability. It means higher profitability firms have high returns volatility. It shows that 1% 
change in firm profitability will bring about 0.19 changes in returns volatility. Firm growth 
coefficient showed negative relationship value of which is equal to -0.01. but the relationship is 
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not significant t-value is less than |2|and similarly p-value of coefficient is 0.462 which is greater 
than 5% p-critical value. Tangibility of assets showed that positive relationship with stock 
returns volatility. The value of TANG coefficient is 0.09. The relationship is insignificant 
because both t-value and p-value showed insignificant results. Coefficient of constant is 0.74 
which positive relationship with stock returns volatility. The relationship is significant because 
both t-value and p-value are significant according to the standard of significant results. 
 
The F-value for the model is 27.39 which is more than 4 according to the rule of thumb therefore 
the overall model is significant so reject the null hypothesis of insignificant model and accept the 
alternative that the model is statistically significant. The adjusted R-squared or R
2 
used that how 
much portion is explained by independent variables of the dependent variable. In our case R
2
is 
12% which suggested that 12% variation in the returns volatility is explained by the managerial 
ownership, institutional ownership, individual ownership, foreign ownership, block holder 
ownership, firm size, firm growth, firm profitability, and tangibility of the assets while the 
Durbin Watson results suggested that there is no time trending as it is not near to 0 or 4. 
Conclusion  
This study focus on the subject of corporate governance which have a significant impact on 
important corporate decisions. This study examined the effect of different type of ownership 
structure such as institutional ownership, managerial ownership, individual ownership, block 
holder ownership and foreign ownership while controlling for variables such as firm size, firm 
growth, tangibility of assets and firm profitability. The research study used the data of eighty 
firms which were selected randomly for the period of six years starting from 2005 from the 
Karachi Stock Exchange KSE-100 index. In this study stock return volatility is considered as 
regressed variable and shareholder or ownership structure as regressor variable. Stepwise 
regression analysis has been used in order to investigate the relationship of each type of 
ownership structure thoroughly with the stock return volatility. The results of multiple regression 
analysis showed that managerial share ownership structure has significant relationship with stock 
return volatility. Similarly block holder and foreign share ownership structure showed significant 
negative relationship with stock returns volatility. 
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Thus from the empirical analysis of the research it is proved the ownership structure play very 
important role in stock returns volatility in addition to minimizing agency relationship problems.  
Managerial share ownership, foreign share ownership and block holder share ownership have 
negative impact on stock returns volatility. With the increase in these type of ownership structure 
stock returns volatility will be decreases. Managerial share ownership, foreign share ownership 
and block holder share ownership bring stability in returns. However in emerging economies 
very less legal protection given to the investors and mostly firms are directed and controlled by 
managers, where they did not run the firm in the interest of shareholders. So that’s why the 
results of this research are strongly aligned with previous studies of emerging economies. 
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